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1    Introduction: the difficulties of universality 
At the very least, human rights theory can be considered as a type of both moral and 
political theory.  Proponents of human rights claim that there is a level beneath which no 
human life should be allowed to descend and that human rights protect the interests that 
constitute that basic level.  The duty to protect these rights is said to fall primarily upon 
states, and thus in many ways, human rights are proposed as constraints on the actions of 
sovereign states in the international arena.  It is in this sense that human rights is very much 
a normative political doctrine, as it claims to compel all states towards certain actions, 
namely the observance of human rights principles.  Of course, since all normative political 
theory (as opposed to descriptive political theory) claims to prescribe how we ought to 
organize our polities, human rights necessarily falls under the larger umbrella of moral 
theory as well.  
 
Inherent to the idea of human rights is the notion of universality; all human beings are said 
to possess these rights.  While it may seem an obvious point, it is important to pause and 
acknowledge the idea of universality.  When we say human rights are universal, we are not 
saying that all people in the world currently enjoy the rights listed in the Declaration; 
entitlement is something much different from enjoyment and it is clear that human rights 
violations occur everyday, without any remedy in sight.  So what we are saying in this 
instance, is that all people in the world ought to enjoy these rights, and that everyone, and 
particularly state actors, ought to refrain from violating them as well.  Thus, human rights 
propose universal constraints on human freedom.  We are free to act as we wish, but only 
up to a certain point- the point where our actions would violate some human rights 
principle.   
 
So while casual contemplation may lead us to associate human rights with ideas like 
freedom, liberty, and autonomy, it is important that we understand the way in which human 
rights act as constraints and limits upon human action.  This is in fact how all moral claims 
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act; by telling us how we ought to behave, they eliminate certain options from our 
choosing.  But proposing these kinds, and any kinds of restraints on human action require 
justification.  The necessity of human rights is not self-evident. 
 
The issue of justification is particularly relevant to the idea of human rights as a political 
doctrine.  Political doctrines are put forth as models to base our laws upon, and laws do 
restrict our freedom in very real ways, with very real consequences if broken.  The punitive 
measures that most always accompany law introduce an element of coercion into the 
picture, particularly for those who do not agree with a given law.  If we are unable to attain 
universal consent (which seems to always be the case), then we will need some way to 
justify our coercion, in this instance, our coercion of those who don’t find human rights to 
be justified.  But justification of some particular political theory is no easy task, especially 
when that political theory is universal in character, as is human rights.   
 
We live in an astoundingly plural world.  Among other things, this plurality is reflected in 
the various ways we answer the fundamental questions of life- questions about human 
nature, God, rationality, goodness, righteousness, purpose, morality, and so on. The 
seemingly permanent diversity of our existence makes justifying common political 
principles extremely tricky.  How can we be sure we aren’t just imposing our particular 
answers to these questions upon others, in a sense, creating “false universals” as Edward 
Said called them?1  This concern is amplified when considered against the backdrop of 
history, both distant and recent.  Human history is one of domination, oppression, and 
persecution.  Both ancient imperialism and modern colonialism seem to have been largely 
predicated upon ideas of righteousness and goodness.  In some sense history teaches us to 
be wary of universality.  
 
So as is the case with any political theory that has been transformed into political reality, 
the legitimacy of human rights will turn upon our ability to justify them.  The problem this 
                                                
1 See Said (1979) 
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thesis looks to resolve--or perhaps better put, investigate--is the problem of justifying a 
singular political morality in a decidedly plural world.  How can we as human beings living 
in a permanently plural world, justify a set of norms to be binding across all cultures and 
traditions?  In particular, how can we do this in a way that is not simply some form of 
imperialism in which the strong impose their preferred political conception upon the weak? 
How can we ensure that our political arrangements do not arbitrarily alienate certain groups 
of citizens? In what way can we consider the idea of human rights to be legitimate?  
 
1.1    The ideas of overlapping consensus and plural justification 
John Rawls attempts to answer similar questions in his Political Liberalism.2  The solution 
that he offers is termed an “overlapping consensus”, and it is this idea that is the primary 
inspiration for this paper.3  Fundamental to Rawls’ theory is the idea that there exist, at any 
given time in one polity, a plurality of what he calls “reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines.”4  These doctrines simultaneously adhere to varied and perhaps even conflicting 
conceptions of  “the good” vis-à-vis human existence. Adherents to such doctrines may 
variously refer to themselves as Christians, Muslims, Scientologists, Secular Humanists, 
Marxists, Liberals, and so forth.  The dilemma of the modern day nation-state, or so it 
seems, is that it can only promote one of these comprehensive doctrines as the basis of 
justice.  The question is, which one should it be?   
 
Posing the question in this fashion however, is precisely the wrong way to go about 
deciding upon fundamental political principles: “the question the dominant tradition has 
tried to answer has no answer: no comprehensive doctrine is appropriate as a political 
conception for a constitutional regime.”5  This claim hinges on two points, the first being 
                                                
2 See Rawls (2005).  Rawls of course, uses a national polity as the subject of his investigation.  Therefore the 
norms that he focuses on are constitutional norms.   
3 See Rawls (2005) pp. 133-172 
4 Rawls (2005) pp. 58-66 
5 Rawls (2005) p. 135 
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the idea that the many comprehensive doctrines that color our society are reasonable, 
meaning that they are “compatible with the full rationality of human persons.”6  The idea is 
that even under optimal conditions of discourse, human beings will necessarily still come 
to disagree on the many fundamental questions of life- questions about reality, nature, God, 
goodness, and rightness. 
 
The second point that is essential to Rawls’ claim concerns the legitimacy of the 
government’s monopoly on the use of coercive power.  If the government is supposed to 
represent the citizens as a collective body, then we should expect that the constitutional 
principles put forth by the government be of the kind that “all citizens as free and equal 
may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to 
their common human reason.” (emphasis added)7  While the total meaning of the term 
“reasonably” in this quotation may not be fully self-evident, we can grasp at least one of its 
implications by referring back to Rawls’ first point (about reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines).  People will reasonably arrive at numerous competing worldviews. Therefore, if 
one of these worldviews is promoted as the political conception of justice, then a number of 
people will be forced to adhere to political arrangements that they reasonably reject.  For 
Rawls, such a consequence is fundamentally unjust, and is an illegitimate use of political 
power.8 
 
The way out of this dilemma then, is to reject the idea that a particular comprehensive 
doctrine can be utilized as a political conception of justice, and embrace some 
“freestanding” conception of justice.9  By referring to it as freestanding, Rawls has in mind 
a political conception of justice that does not require adherence to some particular religious 
or philosophical worldview.  Indeed, in order to be legitimate, the freestanding conception 
of justice must be such that all reasonable citizens can be expected to endorse it.  In this 
                                                
6 Rawls (2005) p. 135 
7 Rawls (2005) p. 137 
8 Rawls (2005) p. 137 
9 Rawls (2005) pp. 10-12 
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sense, it is necessary that “the reasonable doctrines endorse the political conception, each 
from its own point of view.” (emphasis added)10  When this occurs--when some 
constitutional principles have been proposed that members of all the various worldviews 
can support from internally solid grounds--then the “overlapping consensus” has been 
achieved. 
 
In responding to questions about the legitimacy of human rights and about the claims to 
universality that human rights doctrine asserts, I submit that it is necessary to formulate an 
understanding of human rights as a possible focus of an overlapping consensus. .  While the 
subject matter of Rawls’ investigation is constitutional principles in a national polity, we 
can see that the issues and dynamics that he is fundamentally concerned with also apply to 
the internationalization of human rights principles.  In our endorsement of a set of 
fundamental political principles that ought to govern the behavior of all states (and 
consequently individuals), we should envision human rights as a set of norms that can 
function as freestanding principles, capable of being the focus of an overlapping consensus 
by the world’s varied religious and philosophical doctrines.   
 
Hopefully, conceiving of human rights in this way appears immediately intuitive to the 
reader.  It should be fairly clear that human rights is not a comprehensive moral theory.  It 
does not tell us when (or if) it is okay to lie, or break our promises, or cheat on our spouses.  
In fact, it seems that human rights is silent on the majority of moral questions.  Further, as a 
political theory, human rights is not comprehensive in scope either.  It does not tell us how 
we ought to structure our legislative or judicial bodies, organize our armed forces, or 
arrange our nations administratively.   
 
A quick note on terminology: I will in this paper, follow the lead of Tore Lindholm and use 
the term plural justification rather than overlapping consensus, as I think this term more 
                                                
10 Rawls (2005) p. 134 
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clearly represents the spirit of the theory.11  This is because, as was mentioned, Rawls’ 
motivations in Political Liberalism are clearly related to the question of political legitimacy 
and how this is dependent upon the public justification of political principles.  For Rawls, 
political legitimacy requires that constitutional norms be justified in a way that does not 
systematically alienate certain groups of citizens.  In short, the idea of justification is 
central to the theory of an overlapping consensus and so I find the term “plural 
justification” to be a more straightforward “label.” 
 
It is important to mention Lindholm’s work of course, not just because he has helped to 
improve the terminology associated with these ideas, but because he has gone such a long 
way in fleshing out and explicating how we ought to understand the idea of plural 
justification of human rights.12  Indeed, he has addressed the idea of plural justification for 
human rights in a most thorough fashion.  Nonetheless, the theoretical discourse 
surrounding the intersection of human rights and “democracy” with “tradition”, “culture” 
and “religion” is certainly showing no signs of letting up, and many of the insights 
provided by the idea of plural justification of human rights are still going unnoticed or in 
some ways misunderstood.13  While certainly drawing upon Lindholm’s work in this paper, 
I hope to provide a fresh perspective on the theoretical issues involved, emphasizing and 
reformulating the ideas that I find to be of most importance.  Perhaps, if things go really 
well, I can offer a few insights that will add something new to the discussion. 
 
 
                                                
11 See e.g. Lindholm (2008).  Lindholm also uses the term “overlapping justifications” which also seems to 
be fine.  Which term is used is of course not nearly important as the quality of the theory itself, but I think it 
is useful to discard the word “consensus” from the picture, as this can create problems when it becomes 
entangled with the idea of justification. 
12 See Lindholm (1992), (2004), (2005) & (2008) 
13 See e.g. Sachedina (2007). Sachedina seems to fail to differentiate between the UDHR and “anti-religious” 
(for lack of a better word) justifications of human rights that have been needlessly attached to it. 
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1.2    Islam: the implications of the discussion 
Interestingly enough, the introduction I have given thus far only applies to the first half of 
the paper.  The idea of plural justification of human rights will certainly be relevant to the 
second half of the paper, but strictly speaking, the substantial explication and discussion of 
the theory itself will take place in the first half.  The second half of the paper will attempt to 
outline an account of substantive justifications for human rights from the perspective of one 
specific “comprehensive doctrine”- Islam.  To be more specific, I will focus on the work of 
one Islamic scholar--Dr. Khaled Abou El Fadl--and try to piece together an account of 
Islamic justifications for human rights from a selection of his writings.  The 
“compatibility” of Islam and human rights is at the present time an obviously popular topic, 
and I have decided to write on it for that very reason.  However it’s important to be clear 
that I have not chosen Islam simply because it is a hot topic, but rather because of the 
reasons why it is such a hot topic, which point to the larger issues at stake in the discussion.  
Specifically, how we understand and address the discussion on Islam and human rights 
carries with it myriad implications for how we ought to view the idea of secularism in the 
21st century.  What exactly does secularism require?  How ought citizens in plural societies 
justify their political views to one another?   What does something like “separation of 
church and state” really mean?  How should devout religious people deal with the growing 
power of global human rights norms?  These questions, and many more, are implicitly 
answered when we weigh in on the question of Islam and human rights, so it is extremely 
important that we do so armed with the proper intellectual tools.  
  
I won’t have enough space to offer answers that do justice to the many important questions 
that arise when we consider the intersection of religion and human rights.  Nonetheless, I 
hope to at least offer some preliminary insights into the way in which the idea of plural 
justification of human rights ought to orient our approach to such matters.  In this way, the 
second half of the paper, while focusing on Islam, addresses a set of larger questions 
pertaining to religion (or culture, or tradition, or whatever other term is fashionable), as it 
gives us an illustration of the idea of plural justification at work and specifically  
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addresses secularist fears about the compatibility of religion and human rights.14  This 
however, is not to overlook the more conspicuous result of this part of the paper, which 
will be to respond to critics of Islam by pulling together and articulating a reasonable 
account of Islamic justifications for human rights.  With that said, I will begin now with the 
idea of justification and its relevance to human rights. 
                                                
14 Of course, it may seem strange to offer only one account of human rights, and claim this illustrates a 
“plurality” of justifications!  But I do so because I assume that many human rights advocates in the West find 
themselves comfortable assuming the congruence of (some kind of) secularism and human rights.  At the 
same time I recognize that there is no hegemonic account of the justifications for human rights in the West.  
For the argument that human right necessarily rely on religious premises, see Perry (1998). 
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2    The argument for plural justification of human rights 
When people make exceptionalist or relativist arguments and claim to be exempted from 
the demands of human rights, these people are attacking the theoretical justifications of 
human rights.  Essentially, they are saying that human rights are not sufficiently justified to 
warrant universal adherence.  Proponents of human rights will want to reply by 
demonstrating that human rights are indeed justified in some way that leaves such 
exceptionalist claims defeated.  The immediate questions posed here are questions such as:  
Where do human rights come from? Are human rights truly universal? In what sense do 
human rights exist, and how can we prove it?  And so on.  Our answers to these questions 
matter because of the immense importance ascribed to human rights.  Human rights are 
positioned as principles that outweigh competing claims about “what is good.”15  Ronald 
Dworkin has famously referred to human rights as “trumps,”16 in the sense that they act as 
trump cards, almost always beating out conflicting norms. Consequently this means that if 
we are to endorse human rights, then we commit ourselves to the notion that if necessary 
we will be willing to subjugate our other normative beliefs to human rights, even if those 
are deeply held moral principles.  Clearly, to accord human rights this kind of power 
requires that we be thoroughly convinced of their virtue; human rights require strong 
justifications.  The big question is then, what are the justifications for human rights?   
 
2.1    The inherent and equal dignity of all human beings 
A logical starting point in an attempt to answer this question would seem to be the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  The Preamble of the Declaration proclaims that 
the “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
                                                
15 It’s important to emphasize that human rights claim to outweigh only competing claims of what is good, 
that is, claims that would honor some other “good” instead of human rights if a conflict of goods were to 
arise.  Human rights say nothing about their own relationship to goods that raise no issues of conflict.  This 
idea will be fleshed out below. 
16 See Dworkin (1977) 
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members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world.”  Similarly, Article 1 declares that “All human beings are born free and equal in 
dignity and rights.”  Both of these passages indicate a link being drawn between the 
inherent and equal dignity of all human beings, and the rights enumerated in the 
Declaration.  But this idea of inherent and equal dignity is for the most part, as much as the 
Declaration will give us in terms of a grounding of human rights.   
 
The idea of dignity is surely a powerful construct that offers a strong base from which to 
build a justificational framework, but it is clear that no such framework is entailed by the 
idea of dignity alone.  Dignity is an uncertain term, and because of this, human rights 
advocates must address at least two issues if they are to use it as a foundation.  First, it is 
simply not self-evident that people possess rights because they possess dignity.17  
Consequently, the task of any foundational scheme of human rights is to bring to light 
exactly how one ought to understand the idea of human rights as it relates to human 
dignity.  In short, how do we go from dignity to rights?   
 
The second issue that needs to be addressed is the origin of dignity.  The Declaration fails 
to announce exactly where human dignity comes from.  Perhaps God? Or Nature? Reason?  
The consideration and ultimate rejection of such origins by the drafters means that the 
business of determining some such source has also been left to human rights advocates.  
But that the Declaration simultaneously offers a normative foundation (dignity) and fails to 
situate that norm amidst a larger ontological framework, should not be viewed as some sort 
of failure.  Indeed, the foundational restraint employed on the part of the drafters is clearly 
one of the shining achievements of the Declaration.18  In considering the absence of 
“complete” grounds for human rights in the Declaration, we should recognize that the idea 
of inherent and equal dignity is certainly something.  It seems to be an idea that any future 
justificatory scheme will need to engage, but nonetheless it is a normative concept that is 
                                                
17 Lindholm (2004) p. 48 
18 On this point see Lindholm (1999)  
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vague enough that the varied and diverse peoples of the world can clarify its relation to 
rights as they see fit and in accordance with their comprehensive worldviews.  
 
That the Declaration does not force some picture of God or Nature upon us is an impressive 
feat, and the lack of some specific justificatory account within the Declaration opens the 
idea of human rights up to a plurality of possible justifications.  We could argue that human 
rights come from God, and this would not contradict anything in the Declaration.  
Similarly, the Declaration does not deter us from arguing that human rights are a necessary 
consequence of the Reason of humanity.  Examples abound.  But that the Declaration is 
amenable to a variety of justificatory schemes of human rights does not fully answer our 
initial question, which asked, “What are the justifications for human rights?”  The 
Declaration gives us a partial answer; it gives us the guiding principle of inherent and equal 
dignity.  But as for the larger theories that fill in the rest of the puzzle, so to speak, we are 
still left wondering, which is best?  In considering this question, I think it will be useful if 
we first consider the traditional ways in which human rights are justified. 
 
2.2    Natural law justifications of human rights 
Traditional justifications of human rights have most often posited these rights as the 
consequence of some form of natural law.19  Natural law conceptions of human rights tell 
us that human rights exist prior to and independent of their legislation in international and 
national law.  Human rights represent objective moral truths that we are charged with 
discovering and implementing.  Of utmost importance to any natural law system, are the 
foundations from which that system arises- the actual source of those laws.  Typical 
sources cited include things like God, Nature, and Reason.  These metaphysical entities 
serve as powerful justifications for the moral claims represented by natural law systems.  
                                                
19 I overlook the positivist conception of human rights here, so as to save space, but also because I think it is 
unnecessary in the face of my initial assumption that human rights are moral rights.  I do not doubt that we 
shoud also conceive of human rights as legal rights, as long as this not would eliminate our ability to 
conceive of them as moral rights as well. 
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Connecting human rights to ultimate entities like God and Nature gives human rights the 
transcendent quality that we typically associate with universality, particularly its 
connection to inalienability.20   
 
But while rooting human rights in strong metaphysical claims seems to be necessary to 
create an accurate conception of universality, it is also the main reason why relativist and 
exceptionalist arguments are able to persist.  Metaphysical claims about the nature of God, 
or what Reason dictates, are highly contentious and we can often be left feeling that they 
are in some sense impossible to “prove.”  Further, that some people don’t believe in God, 
or don’t believe in some set of abstract laws of Nature, doesn’t seem to be so outrageous.  
The big problem with natural law theories of human rights is not that they seek to relate 
human rights to larger metaphysical claims, but that they are often posited in an “all-or-
none” type of fashion, so that their inability to wash away even the slightest grain of doubt 
seems to demonstrate some kind of failure. This has nothing to do with the quality of our 
theories, and everything to do with the terms of the debate.  Objectors to human rights--be 
they relativists, skeptics, exceptionalists or anything else--are able sustain their positions 
largely due to the immense demands they make of human rights theorists.  The absence of 
some indisputable say-all end-all theory serves to maintain the persistence of these 
objections.   
 
What I want to argue is that an adequate theory of human rights will have to confront this 
issue, and alter the terms of the discussion so that we can come to accept the fact that it is 
neither possible nor desirable to construct one authoritative theory of human rights.  An 
adequate theory of human rights will necessarily allow for a plurality of competing 
justifications.  This is a fairly large claim and it will be important that we understand what 
is and isn’t implied by the promotion of plural justification of human rights. 
 
 
                                                
20 Ulrich (2001) p. 203 
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2.3    The independence of truth and justification 
Many of us like to have faith in the notion of truth and that it does indeed exist; some 
things can be true and others false.  Perhaps we hold some of our beliefs about the world to 
be true, and others we are not so sure of.   But that we know some limited number of truths 
gives us the feeling that in general, truth is accessible and that while discovering it may not 
be an easy task, with enough intellectual hard work we can uncover enough of it to piece 
together substantive and coherent worldviews that do a fairly good job of representing 
truth.  There is also a feeling that the natural path of reason leads towards truth, and that 
this truth is some singular thing.   
 
When two parties disagree about human nature or God, we don’t feel comfortable saying 
that they are both correct, especially if the two sides present mutually exclusive arguments.  
So in regards to human rights and their justifications, it seems that some account is right 
and others wrong, or at the very least some accounts are closer to the truth than others.  It 
seems that accepting a plurality of justifications necessarily means that we will be 
accepting some that are false.  If we want to believe that truth is singular, and that indeed 
there will only be one true account of the justifications of human rights, then don’t we have 
to reject the notion of plural justification?  Or better yet, if we do accept a plurality of 
competing justifications, then do we not commit ourselves to some kind of relativism?  
Isn’t endorsing plural justification just a convenient (and perhaps lazy) way of avoiding the 
difficult task of finding the truth?   
 
These types of questions are certainly valid and important questions.  The apprehension 
that they exhibit towards the idea of plural justification is an apprehension about how the 
concept of truth gets treated through all of this.  Fortunately, once we clarify the different 
ways in which the notions of truth and justification function, we can settle any fears we 
might have about the integrity of moral truth in a plural justificatory scheme.  I will begin 
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by outlining the notion of what Jeffrey Stout has called a “contextualist account of 
justification.”21   
 
2.4    The contextual account of justification 
The starting point for Stout is the idea that “being justified in believing something is a 
relation among a person, a proposition, and an epistemic context.”22  Epistemic contexts 
will vary across cultures and even from person to person.  Because contexts will vary, we 
can see that different people can be justified in holding different beliefs, even contradictory 
beliefs.  Consider theories of the relationship between the movement of the sun and earth.  
In Europe a thousand years ago, it was commonly held that the sun rotated around the 
earth.  This was a perfectly justified belief, given the evidence available to people.  But 
when Copernicus arrives in the early 16th century and delivers a convincing scientific 
account that the earth orbits the sun, the evidence begins to change.  Now in the 21st  
century, if someone were to hold the position that the sun rotates around the earth even 
after being presented evidence to the contrary, we would have a tough time saying that 
person was justified in his or her belief.  A more straightforward example: suppose I tell 
you that I like pizza even though I don’t.  You are perfectly justified in believing that I like 
pizza, even though it’s not true.  The lie that I have told you creates a context wherein it is 
justified for you to believe a falsehood.   
 
So we can see that because epistemic contexts can change, we can be justified in holding 
false beliefs, including moral beliefs.  Similarly, we can justify our belief in certain truths 
by way of false premises.  Suppose I told you that I didn’t like pizza because I am allergic 
to cheese.  But perhaps some time passes and you mix things up a bit.  Now you recall that 
I am allergic to tomatoes, and therefore I don’t like pizza.  In this case you are perfectly 
justified in believing a truth (that I don’t like pizza), based upon a false premise (my allergy 
to tomatoes). 
                                                
21 Stout (1993) 
22 Stout (1993) p. 220 
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The point here is that truth and justification are distinct concepts, and they function with a 
certain amount of independence from each other.  This point however, while important, 
doesn’t directly respond to worries we might have about how the concept of moral truth 
gets treated in a plural justificatory scheme.  It doesn’t answer foundationalist claims that if 
truths about human nature, rationality, goodness, and morality do indeed exist, then we 
ought to pursue those truths and nothing short of them.  To apprehend how different parties 
can accept and endorse competing and exclusive justifications of human rights without 
compromising their own specific claims to truth, we need to keep in mind the point just 
made regarding the independence of truth and justification, and also keep a clear grasp of 
two more points: 1) what kind of process we are engaging in when we attempt to justify 
something, and 2) the fact of reasonable plurality.  I will begin with the first item. 
 
What are we doing when we try to justify something?  Stout says that when we justify a 
belief, we aim to remove relevant doubts regarding that belief.23  Which doubts we 
consider to be relevant will of course depend on whom we are directing our justification 
towards.  What this means is that certain justifications are directed towards certain 
audiences.24  If we are trying to justify a moral belief to multiple audiences, we may need 
to formulate multiple justifications for the same proposition.  But how do we decide who is 
and isn’t part of a certain audience?  Aren’t we all as rational human beings, part of the 
same audience in at least some broad sense?  
 
Traditionally in moral theory, it seems that all human beings have been considered to be 
part of the same audience.  We have been searching for a comprehensive account of some 
universal morality forever.  Consider human rights.  When people raise objections to the 
universal validity of human rights, proponents of human rights will want to reply by 
pointing out the argumentative flaws in these objections.  The human rights advocate will 
                                                
23 Stout (1993) p. 223 
24 Stout (1993) p. 223 
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want to show what is “wrong” with the protester’s line of thinking, thus steering him or her 
in the direction of the “right” way of thinking about human rights.  The inference is that 
there is some correct way of thinking about human rights, which if taken up, will 
demonstrate universal validity.  The idea is that there is some universal set of justifications 
that applies to the whole of humanity as one audience.  This is a common method of 
justifying moralities.  This proper way of thinking about morality is often alternately 
described as “impartial,” “ahistorical,” or “objective.”  James Fishkin describes this 
position as a claim “[t]hat one’s judgments are objectively valid, i.e., that their consistent 
application to everyone is supported by considerations that anyone should accept, were the 
issue viewed from what is deemed to be the appropriate moral perspective.”25  Under this 
approach, the notion of an “appropriate moral perspective” is crucial to the justification of 
moral norms.  The idea is that moral knowledge is not bound to any specific historical or 
cultural perspective, but rather, it is anchored in an objective and ahistorical foundation that 
provides us with universal norms that are immediately justified.  
 
Stout’s contextual account of justification tells us that this type of foundationalist approach 
fails and will continue to fail because it doesn’t understand the concept of justification 
properly.  Foundationalist approaches to justification are explicit in their aim to remove 
themselves from specific contexts.  But the act of justification is an act that is necessarily 
dependent on context.  This is because, as Stout says: 
Justifications are answers to why-questions of a certain sort.  As such, they are 
dependent on context for three reasons: first, because conversational context 
determines the question to which a justification counts as an answer and thus the 
sort of information being requested; second, because conversational context 
determines a justification’s audience; and third, because a justification’s success 
can be appraised only in relation to the epistemic context of its audience, 
including its relevant reasons for doubting and the propositions its members are 
justified in believing.26  
 
                                                
25 Fishkin (1986) p. 210 
26 Stout (1993) p. 224 
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So, when we take part in justification, we are trying to answer specific questions about our 
theory.  If that is the case, then we need to know who is asking the question, what is being 
asked, and what kind of answers have a chance at being successful.  Essentially, when 
some foundationalist moral theory is presented, its author has purported to identify the only 
relevant questions that everyone could ask of her theory.  The theory then, is a response to 
those specific questions.   
 
In essence, the foundationalist may agree with me that context does matter in justification, 
but that with respect to moral truth there exists a “context” that applies universally. Often 
the idea of a universal context is delineated by the notion of rationality, so we get theorists 
who claim to be addressing their arguments to all rational people.  But if foundationalists 
are going to claim to be addressing all rational people with their moral theories, then it will 
be extremely important that they aren’t mistaken in where they draw the line between 
rational and irrational.  This is an extremely difficult task, which I think can be illustrated 
by considering how one contemporary human rights theorist, Alan Gewirth, justifies human 
rights.  
 
2.4.1    Alan Gewirth’s proof of human rights 
Gewirth claims that for any person who wishes to pursue a set of interests (which by 
definition is everybody), action is a necessary precursor.  To pursue our interests, we need 
to be able to act in a way that expresses that pursuit.  He claims that the logical precursors 
to action are the principles of freedom and well-being; action is not possible without these 
two goods.  As necessary goods, freedom and well-being automatically become things that 
we ought to have if we don’t have them.27  As “purposive agents”, we are committed to the 
idea that we have rights to freedom and well-being.  Since all people are purposive agents, 
it follows that as individuals we must endorse the idea that all people have these rights.  
From there, Gewirth suggests that the general rights to freedom and well-being are 
                                                
27 Gewirth (1982) p. 47 
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composed of a larger group of more specific substantive rights, perhaps not much different 
than the list found in the UDHR.28 
 
This is obviously an overly simplistic account of Gewirth’s proof, but it suffices because 
the main point I want to emphasize is Gewirth’s insistence that human rights are logically 
necessary.  Anybody who doesn’t commit themselves to human rights has contradicted 
logic; they have acted irrationally.  So, if Gewirth is correct, then the only people who will 
disagree with his proof are irrational people whom fortunately we don’t need to worry 
about, since we are only concerned with justifying human rights to rational people who 
“play by the rules.”  But it seems to me that a perfectly reasonable person could take issue 
with many of the assumptions of Gewirth's model.  The move from the goods of freedom 
and well-being to a list of rights seems to be questionable, at least in some minimal sense.  
Perhaps freedom and well being can be protected by some mechanisms other than rights.  
It’s certainly not self-evident that such a move is necessary, and it seems plausible that a 
perfectly reasonable person could question the specific list of rights that Gewirth ends at.  
It’s certainly a compelling argument, but his moves are clearly made out of something 
other than deductive necessity. 
 
The point is that Gewirth implicitly claims to be directing his justifications of human rights 
to a universal audience.  But the concepts he employs and the mode of reasoning he uses to 
connect those concepts are not accessible to all reasonable people.  How can a religious 
person who rejects the notion of  Free Will engage this model?  Consider a religious person 
who holds moral beliefs contrary to human rights and holds those beliefs as representative 
of God’s will.  Gewirth is telling this person that he is logically required to disobey God’s 
will!29  A human rights advocate will certainly want to engage these beliefs, but is 
appealing to “the requirements of logic” the best way to do that?  Think about the nature of 
the objections that this religious person might raise.  They will have to do with theology, 
                                                
28 Gewirth (1982) pp. 59-67 
29 Freeman (2004) p. 394 
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faith, and sacred text interpretation; they will introduce issues that Gewirth’s theory is 
simply unequipped to address.  In this sense Gewirth’s justifications are aimed only 
towards a limited audience.    
 
If we imagine a conversation between Gewirth and this hypothetical religious person, it is 
easy to envision a discussion in which the two sides are simply talking past each other.  
Gewirth’s theory does not comment on Christian or Jewish theology.  It has nothing to say 
about Islamic Shari‘ah.  The example serves to illustrate the fact that our respective “moral 
languages” are built upon more than just ideas of right and wrong.  They spring from 
metaphysical and epistemological commitments that are deeply rooted in historical 
tradition.   
 
My aim here is not to imply that Gewirth’s theory would be wholly unintelligible to some 
religious person.  The idea is not that our moral languages are untranslatable across 
cultures.  The point is simply that for some religious people Gewirth’s proof will be an 
inadequate justification of human rights because it ignores the most important pieces of the 
puzzle, in terms of how they make sense of and understand the world.  Going back to the 
idea of justification as “removing relevant doubts,” we can see that Gewirth’s theory does 
not go very far in removing the Muslim’s doubt that the Qur’an calls for inequality between 
men and women.  It simply doesn’t possess the tools to engage such doubts.  The 
contextual account of justification tells us that such objections need to be answered in a 
similar language to the one in which they are posed.  In the example I have used, we are 
talking about religious hermeneutics first and foremost.   
 
The foundationalist may at this point have an objection.  Perhaps she will agree that some 
single account will never be able convince all people of the merit of human rights.  But 
this, she may claim, is similarly true of any plurality of justifications, since some people 
will simply never endorse human rights.  Despots, bigots, racists, and other generally 
unreasonable people will always reject human rights, and so we ought not compromise our 
moral theory on their account.  We ought to pursue the one and only coherent justification 
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of human rights, and when it is discovered, those who remain unswayed by it can simply be 
branded unreasonable and their objections discarded.   
 
In response, I should make clear that I don’t mean to claim that plural justification of 
human rights can solve the problem of vicious and malevolent people.  Sure, human rights 
may never gain the allegiance of all people in the world.  But if we are going to claim that 
such people should be morally criticized for their (anti-human rights) beliefs, then we need 
to be careful whom we include in this group.  Should people be morally criticized for not 
agreeing that human agency and logic alone necessitate human rights?  Similarly, should 
Christians criticize others for not endorsing human rights via the teachings of Jesus Christ? 
I think not.  It’s very possible that there exists a generally reasonable and well thought out 
justification of human rights that will nonetheless be rejected by reasonable people.   The 
point here is that unreasonable people are not the only cause of disagreement in politics.  
Disagreement can and does occur between reasonable and cooperative people, and it is this 
idea that I turn to now.  
 
2.5    Reasonable Disagreement 
Often times when foreign leaders raise objections to human rights, we are told that these 
politicians are merely acting out of a sense of self-preservation.  Appeals to cultural 
relativism are used “as a way to attempt to deflect attention from their repressive 
policies.”30  When political figures make these sorts of objections, their main goal is 
preservation of power, as opposed to revealing moral truth.  This is one way of explaining 
disagreement.  This method of explaining disagreement focuses on the participants in the 
discussion and explains that their behavior or reasoning is to blame.  Perhaps they argue 
out of narrow self-interest, or reason illogically, or simply are not very smart.  In short, 
their inability to participate in a reasonable discussion is the cause of the disagreement 
itself.  For the purposes of this paper though, we aren’t so concerned with disagreement 
caused in this way.  This is because, as Rawls says, “we always work at first within ideal 
                                                
30 Donnelly (2003) p. 100 
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theory.”31  First and foremost, we ask the question, “Can people who nonetheless agree on 
the normative value of human rights, reasonably disagree on the justifications of those 
rights?”  In other words, even under ideal conditions where all discussants value human 
rights, reason to the best of their abilities, and aim to reach agreement- will we nonetheless 
find disagreement regarding the grounds of human rights?  I think we will. 
 
2.5.1    The burdens of judgment 
Rawls’ account of the “burdens of judgment” is perhaps the most useful tool we can use in 
trying to understand how reasonable people can arrive at irreconcilable disagreement.  By 
“reasonable” here, I suppose I have in mind something like Rawls’ articulation of the term 
as a desire to propose, discuss, and honor fair terms of cooperation and “be fully 
cooperating members of society.”32  The burdens of judgment, as Rawls says, are “the 
many hazards involved in the correct (and conscientious) exercise of our powers of reason 
and judgment in the ordinary course of political life.”33  The idea is that as humans we are 
not perfect beings, and that exercising our faculties of reason with regards to moral and 
political questions is no easy task.  Rawls lists six specific burdens of judgment although he 
admits his list is not exhaustive.  The list is worth quoting in full: 
a.  The evidence--empirical and scientific--bearing on the case is conflicting and 
complex, and thus hard to assess and evaluate. 
 
b.  Even where we agree fully about the kinds of considerations that are relevant, 
we may disagree about their weight, and so arrive at different judgments. 
 
c.  To some extent all our concepts, and not only moral and political concepts, are 
vague and subject to hard cases; and this indeterminacy means that we must rely 
on judgment and interpretation (and on judgments about interpretations) within 
some range (not sharply specifiable) where reasonable persons may differ. 
 
d.  To some extent (how great we cannot tell) the way we assess evidence and 
weight moral and political values is shaped by our total experience, our whole 
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32 See Rawls (2005) pp. 48-55 
33 Rawls (2005) p. 56 
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course of life up to now; and our total experience must always differ.  Thus, in a 
modern society with its numerous offices and positions, its various divisions of 
labor, its many social groups and their ethnic variety, citizens’ total experiences 
are disparate enough for their judgments to diverge, at least to some degree, on 
many if not most cases of any significant complexity. 
 
e.  Often there are different kinds of normative considerations of different force on 
both sides of an issue and it is difficult to make an overall assessment. 
 
f.  Any system of social institutions is limited in the values it can admit so that 
some selection must be made from the full range of moral and political values that 
might be realized.  This is because any system of institutions has, as it were, a 
limited social space.  In being forced to select among cherished values, or when 
we hold to several and must restrict each in view of the requirements of others, we 
face great difficulties in setting priorities and making adjustments.  Many hard 
decisions may seem to have no clear answer.34 
 
The immediate value of Rawls’ ideas here does not lie in whether or not these epistemic 
conditions he describes actually represent reality (although I am inclined to say they do).  
More important, is the idea that we have a moral duty to articulate and endorse these 
burdens of judgment.  
 
The idea of the burdens of judgment takes on a moral character when we ask the question, 
“How ought we explain disagreement?”  At first glance this may appear to be a strange 
question, so I should clarify what type of disagreement I refer to.  This question does not 
refer to a specific instance of disagreement over a particular issue, but rather to the 
widespread and persistent disagreement that characterizes plural societies.  This type of 
disagreement covers a wide spectrum of issues, only one of which is the question of the 
grounds of human rights.  The most immediate way to deal with such disagreement is 
through elimination or suppression of those with opposing views.  This of course, is not a 
legitimate option from a human rights perspective.35  Regardless of how some liberal 
society decides to adjudicate disagreement in the public sphere, any such society must 
                                                
34 Rawls (2005) pp. 56-57 
35 Grimen (1999) p. 111 
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possess some way of publicly understanding and explaining that disagreement.36  The 
reason this is necessary is because, as Harald Grimen puts it, “When citizens cannot 
mutually respect persistent disagreement their political culture cannot be liberal.  It lacks 
mechanisms that enable them to abstain in a justifiable way from eliminating or 
suppressing opinions or persons with whom they disagree.”37  Beyond this instrumental 
value, we should also recognize the value of mutual respect of disagreement as a good in 
itself.  Citizens cannot claim to recognize each other as possessing inherent and equal 
dignity if they refuse to respect reasonable disagreement.38  So how we explain persistent 
disagreement matters.  Grimen offers an invaluable discussion on this issue.  I will try now 
to quickly outline what I see to be his most valuable point, which is a point about 
neutrality. 
 
Grimen explains that the overarching requirement we must place on our explanations of 
disagreement is that they be relatively neutral.  In order to foster mutual respect of our 
disagreement on basic religious, moral and political questions, our explanation cannot seem 
to take the side of one party to the disagreement.  An explanation that condemns the 
reasoning or motives of one of the parties involved is guilty of such bias.  When we say 
that disagreement is caused by someone’s acting out of self-interest, prejudice, bias, or 
ideological blindness, our explanation easily becomes a part of the dispute.39  The party 
being accused of such faults will surely reject this explanation, as she will have no reason 
to suspect that her arguments are respected. Characterizing one participant’s behavior as 
unreasonable is clearly not a neutral way to explain disagreement.   
 
The reader might now object that sometimes people do argue out of prejudice and self-
interest, and that we ought to call that what it is- unreasonable.  This is fine, I accept this 
                                                
36 I use the term “liberal society” here as a synonym for a society that respects human rights.  Perhaps the 
congruence of these two ideas is not self-evident, but this is not the time to argue such a point. 
37 Grimen (1999) p. 111 
38 This point will be better clarified in the discussion below on tolerance. 
39 Grimen (1999) p. 116 
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point.  We certainly shouldn’t pretend that unreasonable people don’t exist.  However, the 
point of this discussion is to explore how we can explain systematic and persistent 
disagreement in a plural society in a way that fosters mutual respect among citizens.  If we 
aim to create an environment where citizens can respect each other, then other ways of 
explaining disagreement must be made available. 
 
So our public explanations of disagreement can’t blame the participants involved, as this is 
a decidedly biased approach.  This is one way to think about the neutrality that we seek.  
Grimen goes on to explain that another way in which our explanations of disagreement will 
need to be neutral is that those explanations must not “rely upon too strong normative or 
epistemic premises”, meaning that we should avoid comprehensive theories about the 
nature of moral or political issues.40  So for example, suppose we explain our disagreement 
using some sort of moral relativism.  We say that moral values are relative and that 
Muslims, Christians, Atheists, and Hindus all adhere to differing value systems.  When 
these groups come together in a plural society, it is no wonder that they cannot come to 
agreement on many issues, for the value systems of each group are incommensurable with 
each other.  Agreement is impossible.  The problem here is that some people may reject a 
relativism of this kind.  Some person might not think that values are incommensurable 
across religions, and thus the discussion can be brought to an end based on premises that 
this person expressly rejects.41  This kind of explanation is exactly what Grimen has in 
mind when he talks of epistemic premises that are “too strong.”  Using such premises can 
easily result in one side feeling that his or her argument has been disrespected.   
 
Keeping these two conceptions of neutrality in mind, Grimen’s argument, which I am 
inclined to agree with, is that the account of the burdens of judgment is the most neutral 
way to explain disagreement and thus stands as the best method of explanation, in terms of 
serving as a public basis of mutual respect for disagreement.  The burdens of judgment do 
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41 Grimen (1999) p. 118 
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not presuppose any defects in the participants reasoning or behavior- everyone involved is 
assumed to behave reasonably.  These burdens exist independent of our reasoning and 
behavior, and no matter how well we reason, they are simply unavoidable.   
 
The burdens also do not presuppose any strong normative or epistemic premises.42  They 
do of course rest on some epistemic assumptions, but these are decidedly weak 
assumptions.  It is certainly possible that someone could object to any one (or all) of the six 
items in Rawls’ list of burdens.  In this sense, the burdens are not perfectly neutral.  But 
this is why Grimen uses the phrase “relatively neutral” to describe what we want from our 
explanation of disagreement.  It is doubtful that there even is such a thing as “perfect” 
neutrality available to us.  
 
Because the burdens satisfy these two requirements of neutrality, they become easily 
accessible to all citizens, and thus provide a feasible public basis of mutual respect for 
disagreement.  In as much as we ought to value the ideal of mutual respect of disagreement, 
Grimen’s points constitute a moral argument for our endorsement of the burdens.  
 
It is important now to clarify how this relates to the question of the justification of human 
rights.  The consequences of the burdens of judgment are such that even under ideal 
conditions of discussion--conditions in which participants behave reasonably and 
altruistically--we are still bound to arrive at disagreement regarding fundamental 
philosophical, moral, and political issues.  That is to say, in an ideal world where people 
are free to construct, discuss, revise, and adopt beliefs regarding fundamental metaphysical, 
epistemic and moral questions, given the limits of the human capability to reason we can 
expect to find a variety of reasonable positions--and hence a variety of reasonable 
justifications for human rights--that could only be repressed or excluded from public life 
arbitrarily.43   
                                                
42 Grimen (1999) pp. 121-122. 
43 It should be noted of course, that in such an ideal world, we should also expect to find a number of 
“unreasonable comprehensive doctrines.”  We do not mind denying these doctrines public legitimacy 
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Now, it may seem strange to talk about “excluding” certain justificatory accounts of human 
rights from public life.  Isn’t it obvious that a human rights-friendly government would 
necessarily allow for a plurality of justifications, simply due to its protection of freedom of 
speech?  Isn’t it also obvious that any theorist committed to human rights would also feel 
compelled to tolerate foundational accounts of human rights with which he disagreed? Both 
these statements are true indeed.  However, these points allow us to clarify exactly what a 
total commitment to plural justification requires.  The argument for plural justification of 
human rights is not simply a call for toleration.  In fact, when pressed, we can see that it 
calls for a political morality that extends beyond and even criticizes conventional notions of 
tolerance. 
 
2.6    The limits of tolerance   
Traditional conceptions of tolerance advocate an ethic of restraint or noninterference in the 
lives of others.  Individuals ought to exercise restraint in spite of the disagreement or 
disapproval they hold towards other’s words or deeds.  From this perspective, the 
obligations laid upon individuals are largely negative in nature, requiring them to abstain 
from repressing or stifling others’ “freedom to be different,” so to speak. 44  The value of 
such an ethic has certainly been proven over time, but it seems doubtful that the idea of 
tolerance can adequately guide us in our pursuit of satisfactory justifications of human 
rights.  The reason being, as Lindholm says, is that “at its core toleration constitutes a 
                                                                                                                                               
precisely because they are unreasonable.  From this point, the reader can see that the term reasonable is used 
here as a distinctly moral concept.  What grounds we rely upon for denying certain comprehensive doctrines 
public legitimacy i.e. labeling such doctrines “unreasonable,” certainly requires principled argument.  It’s 
possible that support for human rights could play a primary role in articulating such grounds.  This paper 
however, is not about constructing a specific justificatory account of human rights, but rather is primarily 
concerned with how various human rights advocates should deal with the difficult task of agreeing on some 
specific justification of human rights.  It is in this sense that I follow Rawls’ advice and work first in ideal 
theory. 
44 Schiffman (2003) pp. 4-15 
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merely prudential determination to put up with other beliefs.”45  This pragmatism, 
characterized by its conferral of mainly negative obligations upon individuals, can serve to 
foster an apathy that “subtly emasculates the sympathetic instinct to engage, understand, 
and ultimately respect others.”46  The result is that, while “tolerated,” minority viewpoints 
can often be hastily discounted or ignored, on account of their attachment to non-dominant 
traditions.  This conception of tolerance seems to be in some ways connected to and 
supportive of the contemporary liberal trend of calling for the filtering of religious beliefs 
in the public sphere.47  Calls for such filtering essentially tell religious people that tolerance 
of their beliefs does not equate to taking those beliefs seriously.  This kind of staunch 
secularism is precisely what the idea of plural justification of human rights aims to 
neutralize.   
 
Fully acknowledging the fact of reasonable disagreement and how this fact will affect our 
deliberations on the philosophical foundations of human rights requires that we go beyond 
the minimal requirements of toleration.  It demands that we recognize the fact that others 
can and will hold reasonable justifications for human rights that partially or even totally 
contradict our own understanding of the foundations of human rights, and that those 
contradictory justifications are indeed necessary to the proper grounding of human rights. 
 
So when I talk about the “exclusion” of particular accounts of human rights from the public 
sphere, what I have in mind is essentially any failure to emphasize the inherent receptibility 
of human rights to a variety of foundational schemes.  The responsibility to refrain from 
publicly espousing a particular justification of human rights to be the “universal 
justification” falls on all human rights advocates.  We can see though, that this 
responsibility increases according to the influence and power that individuals or groups 
may hold, in terms of forming public opinion on human rights.  So for example, we should 
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absolutely expect all United Nations bodies to refrain from endorsing some specific 
philosophical explanation of human rights.  Similarly, we should hope that national 
governments would also abstain from singling out some specific foundational account as 
the only legitimate theory.  It is also important that authoritative institutions such as 
universities and religious authorities exercise this type of restraint. 
 
It may at this point begin to feel as if the requirements of advocating plural justification of 
human rights are so demanding that they incapacitate our ability to form and advocate 
actual justifications for human rights.  It may seem that in an effort to accommodate a 
range of moral foundations, the door has been left too far open and relativism or perhaps 
skepticism, if they haven’t already, will soon creep into our theory.48  Haven’t I just 
claimed that no person or group ought to claim that his or her favored justification of 
human rights is true?  Doesn’t this mean that I am advocating a theory that either claims 
that all justifications of human rights are either simultaneously true, or simultaneously 
“unprovable”? 
 
2.7    Skepticism, relativism and fallibilism   
To respond to these questions it is important that we now recall the discussion on truth and 
justification, and the clarification of the fact that truth and justification function 
independent of each other.  That someone holds a justified belief does not make that belief 
true.  The idea of reasonable disagreement as explained via the burdens of judgment does 
not presume a different functional relationship between truth and justification.  The key 
consideration introduced by the account of reasonable disagreement is that people can have 
good reasons to believe things that we find to be false.  Recognition of the burdens of 
judgment does not contradict a claim that one’s own position is true or better than those of 
others.  It does however contradict the thought that one’s own position is the only position 
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supported by good reasons.49  Commenting on the consequences of recognizing the burdens 
of judgment, Rawls explains: 
Above all, it does not argue that we should be hesitant and uncertain, much less 
skeptical, about our own beliefs.  Rather, we are to recognize the practical 
impossibility of reaching reasonable and workable political agreement in 
judgment on the truth of comprehensive doctrines, especially an agreement that 
might serve the political purpose, say, of achieving peace and concord in a society 
characterized by religious and philosophical differences.50 
 
The “practical impossibility” of agreeing on the grounds of human rights places moral 
constraints on how we ought to think about the project of justification.  We can certainly 
argue for our version of the truth and criticize those who disagree, but we have a moral 
duty to not only respect competing accounts of human rights, but to accept these accounts 
as adequate and legitimate.51  A world in which every human believes the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth, is simply utopian.  So we are not compelled to relativism or 
skepticism by endorsing the idea that human rights require plural justification.  But while 
we need not endorse these more radical positions, I think we ought to maintain a sense of 
fallibilism in regards to moral knowledge.  The account I have presented of plural 
justification for human rights clearly supports such a conclusion.   
 
Understanding justification as an activity whose success is dependent upon context, and 
admitting that context is subject to change in ways we cannot foresee, we would be wise to 
approach our justifications of human rights, and even our commitment to human rights 
itself, with fallibilist attitudes.52  Our recognition of the existence of reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines that propound justifications of human rights we believe to be 
false, reminds us that other people reasonably hold our favored justifications of human 
rights to be false as well.  To repeat, these facts do not require us to doubt our moral beliefs 
or our justifications of those beliefs, but merely to acknowledge the fact that there may 
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52 See Stout (1993) pp. 219-223 on this point. 
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come a time when we should revise our current beliefs.  Until we are given good reasons to 
engage such a process of revision, we can treat our current justifications of human rights as 
“true”, or if we prefer, as “the best available”.  Simply put, to admit the fallibility of our 
knowledge is to admit that we are not perfect beings and that we can always improve our 
moral and political theory. 
 
2.8    Summarizing the argument for plural justification of human rights 
The argument thus far has centered itself on two main ideas: 1) the contextual account of 
justification, and 2) the fact of reasonable disagreement.  Jeffrey Stout’s contextual account 
of justification tells us that both being justified in believing something and the act of 
justifying some proposition are dependent upon the epistemic contexts of the persons 
involved.  In particular, the act of justifying has been characterized as removing the 
relevant doubts of a particular audience.  Epistemic contexts necessarily vary; people act 
and reason in accordance with established prior beliefs, moral vocabularies, styles of 
reasoning and available evidence.53  The consequences of this reality are that different 
people can be justified in holding contradictory beliefs, and similarly, different people can 
justify the same belief through mutually exclusive premises.  What this serves to illustrate 
(and really what this all boils down to), is that truth and justification function independently 
of one another.  In terms of the justification of human rights, this means that it is certainly 
possible for a plurality of justifications to exist simultaneously.  The question this 
discussion raises though is whether or not a plurality of justifications is desirable or 
necessary. 
 
The contextual account of justification leads us to the intuitive point that our justifications 
for some proposition, will vary according to the audience being addressed.  This seems fine 
for simple, everyday types of propositions, but when human rights is the proposition being 
justified, we are tempted to call it a special sort of proposition.  The preeminence of human 
rights norms, specifically the fact that they are thought of as universal norms, seems to 
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suggest that they represent a special case in which the “audience” involved is indeed the 
whole of humanity, which shares a particular “human context.”  Thus, we question whether 
a plurality of justifications is appropriate for human rights.  The idea of reasonable 
disagreement offers an answer to this question. 
 
The idea of reasonable disagreement explained via Rawls’ burdens of judgment tells us that 
even under ideal conditions of discourse, people will inevitably come to disagree on the 
foundations of human rights.  This is due to the complexity of the issues involved in 
formulating some justificatory account for human rights.  Such an account will need to 
address a variety of troublesome concepts: things like human nature, God, reason, 
goodness, justice, and so on.  The limits of the human mind--spelled out partially by the 
account of the burdens of judgment--prohibit us from being able to freely agree on these 
points to the point of absolute consensus.  To put this conclusion in the language of Jeffrey 
Stout would be to say that the whole of humanity can never function as the “audience” of 
any one particular justification of human rights.  Thus, plural justification of human rights 
is necessary.   
 
I recap the core of my argument so far so that it can be extended a bit.  The points about the 
contextuality of justification and the fact of reasonable disagreement are largely an appeal 
to the reader’s reason.  Hopefully the argument has been persuasive.  Even if it has, it’s still 
important to press the importance of plural justification of human rights a bit further.  
Admitting that people will naturally disagree on the foundations of human rights feels in 
some ways like a negative or indirect argument for plural justification.  We would prefer 
for everyone to endorse the one true justification of human rights, but since it’s not possible 
we instead settle for a range of justifications, some of them being necessarily false.  What I 
would like to do now is clarify the moral argument for plural justification, so that we can 
feel compelled towards it in a way that goes beyond practical necessity.  Most of the 
proceeding points have already been hinted at above, but it will be good to pull them all 
together and spell out, precisely, the moral argument for plural justification. 
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2.8.1    The moral argument for plural justification of human rights 
This argument is actually quite simple.  The idea of reasonable disagreement demonstrates 
the inevitability of a number of foundational accounts of human rights, but more 
importantly, it tells us that those accounts will be comprised of good reasons.  While 
carrying a number of connotations, the idea of “good reasons” most immediately forbids 
exclusion of such accounts from the public sphere.  The public honoring of one reasonable 
account of human rights out of many can prove to be nothing other than an arbitrary 
distinction.  That our reasonable plurality commands respect is further fleshed out by 
Article 18 of the UDHR, which proclaims the human right to freedom of thought, 
conscience, and religion.54  But more than anything else, as Lindholm points out, the 
doctrine of equal and inherent dignity enshrined in the UDHR solidifies this point: 
mutual recognition of the equal and inviolable dignity and the inherent freedom of 
every human being would be pragmatically incoherent, among adherents of 
differing and more or less rivaling religions or beliefs, if the parties were to shrink 
from committing themselves to the pursuit of the goal of unforced ‘trans-
doctrinal’, cross-cultural, and inter-religious justification of human rights55 
 
An account of the foundations of human rights is morally deficient if it fails to recognize 
the reasonableness and necessity of a plurality of theories.  The idea of tolerance is not 
strong enough to capture the essence of this commitment, as it lacks a certain moral 
urgency.  It’s not just that we ought to tolerate a variety of justificatory accounts; plurality 
becomes pluralism when we promote such diversity.  The equal and inherent dignity of all 
human beings mandates that people ought to be able, indeed encouraged, to square the idea 
of human rights with their deeper comprehensive beliefs. 
 
                                                
54 Lindholm (2008) p. 24 
55 Lindholm (2008) p. 24 
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3    Illustrating plural justification: Khaled Abou El Fadl and Islamic grounds 
for human rights 
Even though up to this point the idea of plural justification has been explicated, it will still 
be important to illustrate this concept in action.  I have argued that human rights theory 
can, and indeed ought to be, characterized by a plurality of justificatory frameworks.  But 
this does not mean that any and all comprehensive doctrines will possess the requisite tools 
for building such a framework.  Some will most certainly not.  Worldviews that 
fundamentally deny the inherent dignity of human beings, and that endorse the degradation 
and debasement of certain members of society will not be able to endorse human rights, no 
matter how much we bend and massage them.  But for the sake of stability, we should hope 
(and aim) for as wide an overlapping consensus as possible.  People do not like being 
subjected to laws that they feel are unjustified; (seemingly) arbitrary coercion will most 
certainly foster resentment and animosity amongst those who feel coerced.  Achieving this 
overlapping consensus will require work however. 
 
Human rights are a young phenomenon, officially only 60 years old if we mark the creation 
of the UDHR as a birth date.  Because many of the world’s major religions predate human 
rights by hundreds, if not thousands of years, we can expect that a certain amount of 
deconstruction, reconstruction, and reinterpretation will be necessary in order for many 
traditions to foster substantive internal support for human rights.  It is certainly true that 
many religions and cultures possess indigenous values and norms that are compatible with 
human rights- liberty, political participation, justice, welfare and so forth.  But human 
rights are more than just abstract values.  Human rights doctrine sets out specific 
substantive claims and entitlements that all human beings are empowered to demand of the 
state.  This entitlement/claim aspect of human rights is the new idea, and it is the gap from 
abstract values to specific rights that needs to be closed by any justificatory scheme.  
 
It will be useful to examine a specific instance of the construction of a religious 
justification for human rights.  It will allow us to seriously engage the opportunities and 
challenges associated with such an endeavor, thus giving us a better feel for the merits and 
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demerits of the notion of plural justification.  With these aims in mind, I will try to examine 
the possibilities of Islamic grounds for human rights, with a focus on the work of Khaled 
Abou El Fadl.  The question of the compatibility of Islam and human rights is a popular 
question as of late, and Abou El Fadl is certainly not the only Muslim scholar to answer in 
the affirmative.  However, it will be useful to focus solely on his work, so that that the 
account we consider is as definite as possible.  Contemporary Muslim scholars are 
generating a wealth of interesting theories regarding the congruity of Islam and human 
rights, but in surveying a range of these ideas at once, we run the risk of simply 
highlighting a number of “human rights-friendly” concepts from the Qur’an and failing to 
construct a systematic and complete theory of justification.  Focusing on a single account 
will put us in a much better position to appraise the structure and outcome of the theory of 
plural justification.  It is important to note of course, that I am not, and do not claim to be 
an expert in Islamic theology or Shari‘ah (Islamic law). 56  This however should not detract 
too much from the value of this section, since my main goal here is exegesis of Abou El 
Fadl’s major ideas.  
 
3.1    Starting points: moral truths 
As a point of departure in his work, Abou El Fadl accepts that moral truth does indeed 
exist.  There is an objective morality that exists apart from human beings’ recognition or 
acknowledgement of it.  This claim is supported by the manner in which values such as 
goodness, justice, honesty, compassion and mercy are treated in the Qur’an.  Humans are 
called upon to utilize their rational faculties as instruments of recognizing and 
consummating these moral values.57  Furthermore, these moral values are repeatedly 
                                                
56 It is a bit misleading to translate the term Shari‘ah as “Islamic law”, as it actually refers to a range of 
normative commitments that do not necessarily function in the way that “law” is commonly understood.  This 
point will be clarified as the paper progresses, and so, in the spirit of simplicity I begin here with the popular 
rendering of Shari‘ah as “law”.   
57 Abou El Fadl (2004-2005) p. 5.  The specific terms used include cogntion (fikr), reason (‘aql), and 
remembrance (dhikr).   
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connected to the idea of Divinity in a way such that “recognition of Divinity necessitates 
the recognition of the values that attach themselves to the Divine.”58  The manner in which 
human beings come to know this morality is through Shari‘ah, which translates roughly to 
“way” or “path.”59  In this sense it is the path of God, who embodies objective morality in 
his perfection.  For Abou El Fadl,  a proper understanding of the nature of Shari‘ah is 
essential to the discussion of human rights because of “the central role it plays in Muslim 
life,”60 and also because any “Islamic theory [of human rights] has to be expressed within 
the framework of Islamic principles.”61 
 
The two main sources of Shari‘ah are the Qur’an and Sunnah.62  The primacy of these 
sources becomes clear once we consider their relationship to God.  The Qur’an is the word 
of God as revealed to the Prophet Muhammad, and as such it is quite clearly an indication 
of God’s commandments and pronouncements regarding human activity.  The Sunnah can 
best be conceived as the words, deeds, and consents of the Prophet,63 and are articulated in 
the Qur’an as being Divinely inspired.64  Being Divinely inspired, the Sunnah of the 
                                                
58 Abou El Fadl (2004-2005) p. 5 
59 More literally, Shari‘ah means the “way” or “path” to a source of water. 
60 Abou El Fadl (2004) p. 30 
61 Abou El Fadl (2004-2005) p. 3 
62 In Sunni Islam, juristic consensus (ijma‘) and analogical reasoning (qiyas) are widely held to be additional 
sources of Shari‘ah.  Further sources and proofs based in human reasoning and interpretation (ijtihad) are also 
considered to hold varying degrees of validity across legal schools and between jurists.  For the (rather 
simple) purposes of this paper, I think it will be best right now if the reader focuses on and recognizes the fact 
that the primary sources of Shari‘ah are the Qur’an and Sunnah.  Nonetheless, a basic familiarity of the 
concept of ijtihad and the proofs that spring from it is recommended.  For this, see: Kamali (2008) pp. 14-67 
& 162-178  
63 Specific accounts of particular words and deeds are known as Hadith.  Conceptualizing the relationship 
between Hadith and Sunnah can be a bit tricky, as the two seem to often be used interchangeably.  But from 
my understanding, it is best to think of  a Hadith as a specific account of  a saying or action of the Prophet, 
whereas the Sunnah represents the actual cumulative substance of such accounts. 
64 Kamali (2008) p. 23.  Also see Qur’an 53:3-4 
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Prophet is meant to set a binding normative example upon Muslims.65  So, it will be good 
to keep in mind that when we talk about Shari‘ah, we are talking about normative 
obligations that spring primarily from the Qur’an and Sunnah, the authority of which lies in 
their revelation by God to humanity. 
 
3.2    The epistemology of Shari‘ah 
Abou El Fadl stresses that in order to develop a proper conception of human rights in an 
Islamic context, we will need to set out from an “informed understanding of the 
epistemology of Shari‘ah.”66  An enlightened conception of the relationship between 
human knowledge and God’s law will help us in our consideration of an immediate 
dilemma that confronts the intersection of human rights and any theology- the question of 
the relationship between God and (human) law.  In the Islamic context, this dilemma is 
magnified due to the fact that God has revealed the proper way to live, embodied in the 
directives of the Qur’an and Sunnah.  So the question arises, if God is conceived as 
omniscient and omnipotent, and if he has revealed his law to us, then how can we as people 
create laws and rights of our own?  We can flesh out this dilemma more clearly if we 
consider the concept of democracy, specifically the language of democracy, which is 
inextricably linked to the idea of human rights.   
 
In a democratic order, we are often fond of saying that “sovereignty belongs to the people,” 
and that laws should be enacted according to the “will of the people,” and so forth.  But 
these sorts of claims seem to fly in the face of the Muslim’s commitments to the 
omniscience of God and the perfection of Shari‘ah.  If God is all-powerful, then it should 
be clear to us that God is the only sovereign entity and consequently, the only legitimate 
legislator.  Legislation qua Shari‘ah occurs in accordance with God’s will, rather than the 
will of the people.  Any rights-talk will have to acknowledge that God is the “giver and 
taker” of rights and that humans possess only those rights provided by Shari‘ah- none more 
                                                
65 Kamali (2008) p. 24.  Also see Qur’an 4:80, 59:7 
66 Abou El Fadl (2003) p. 321 
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and none less.67  So by this account, human rights theory as it pertains to the UDHR and 
other international human rights documents is rendered largely superfluous.  The problem 
with this approach however, is that its conception of the epistemology of Shari‘ah lacks the 
“informed understanding” that Abou El Fadl has declared to be so important. 
 
Abou El Fadl does not dispute God’s sovereignty, nor does he dispute the perfection of 
Shari‘ah.  What he does dispute however is the assumption that extracting law from the 
Qur’an is somehow a simple and straightforward project, such that all other moral and legal 
discourses (such as human rights) become irrelevant.  The Qur’an contains 6,235 verses yet 
there are only around 350 “legal verses,” most of which articulate “broad and 
comprehensive principles,” rather than positive rules of law.68  The 80 or so verses that can 
be read to declare specific legal injunctions are not enough to organize a political unit 
around.  What this means is that human beings are going to have to do some interpretive 
work in order to extract a comprehensive body of law from the Qur’an.69  And so, Abou El 
Fadl emphasizes that Shari‘ah is more than “simply a bunch of ahkam (a set of positive 
rules).”70  Indeed, the positive rules are part of it, but Shari‘ah also includes general 
principles of law and morality, as well as methodologies for extracting and formulating the 
law.71  Recognizing that Shari‘ah is much more than explicit legal precepts focuses our 
attention on the paradox that this Divine ideal necessarily “relies on the interpretive act of 
the human agent for its production and execution.”72   
 
The intellectual tools for addressing this predicament are nonetheless available to us 
through classical Islamic discourses.  These discourses outlined the distinction between 
                                                
67 Abou El Fadl (2003) p. 318 
68 Kamali (2008) p. 20 
69 It should be easy to see that interpretation will also be necessary for extracting law from the Sunnah, 
simply due to the nature of inductive and deductive reasoning. 
70 Abou El Fadl (2003) p. 325 
71 Abou El Fadl, Islam and Democratic Commitment (2003) p. 29   
72 Abou El Fadl (2003) p. 321 
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Shari‘ah and fiqh (knowledge).  Representing the path to God, Shari‘ah personifies a 
perfection and immutability that is independent of our conception of it.  Fiqh however, 
embodies the very human process of exploring Shari‘ah and providing practical directives 
on specific situations that Muslims may encounter in everyday life.  As an inescapably 
rational undertaking, fiqh carries with it the very real possibility of error.  Abou El Fadl 
goes on to demonstrate how this distinction between Shari‘ah and fiqh, and particularly the 
conception of Shari‘ah as an ideal only potentially realizable through fiqh, lends itself to a 
sort of fallibilist morality.73 
 
Such an epistemology has contributed to the juristic discourse’s development and 
articulation of a conceptualization of the search for truth and knowledge, which declares 
this search to be not only virtuous, but also obligatory.  Abou El Fadl explains that in 
dealing with the question of moral truth, classical Muslim jurists were hesitant to suggest 
that Muslims were obliged to find it.  A particular hadith attributed to the Prophet stated 
that “Every mujtahid74 is correct” or “Every mujtahid will be [justly] rewarded,” thus 
indicating that there could be multiple correct answers to the same question.75  The 
implications of such a philosophy have been borne out in the existence of multiple legal 
schools of thought, all considered equally orthodox.76  Thus, on the question of moral truth 
most Muslim jurists committed themselves to one of two possible answers. The first of 
which suggested that moral truth would not be revealed until the Final Day, and the other 
suggesting that God did not intend for human beings to discover particular moral truths 
(otherwise God would have made the evidence for moral truth decisively clear).77 
Underlying both of these positions seems to be the idea that absolute moral knowledge is 
                                                
73 Abou El Fadl (2003) pp. 323-327 
74 Essentially, a mujtahid is a jurist engaged in formulation of independent judgments regarding Shari‘ah. 
75 I recount this hadith as quoted in Abou El Fadl (2003) p. 323 
76 There are currently four schools of jurisprudence in Sunni Islam, all of which lodge equally valid claims of 
representing Shari‘ah. 
77 Abou El Fadl (2003) pp.323-325.  These groups are known as the mukhatti’ah, and the musawwibah, 
respectively.   
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simply too elusive to consider its attainment to be obligatory on Muslims.  For Abou El 
Fadl, this has profound implications for how we ought to view the relationship between 
Shari‘ah and the state: 
Building upon this intellectual heritage, I would suggest that Shari‘a ought to 
stand in an Islamic polity as a symbolic construct for the Divine perfection that is 
unreachable by human effort. […] Shari‘a as conceived by God is flawless, but as 
understood by human beings, it is imperfect and contingent.   […] If a legal 
opinion is adopted and enforced by the state, it cannot be said to be God’s law.  
By passing through the determinative and enforcement processes of the state, the 
legal opinion is no longer simply a potential – it has become an actual law, applied 
and enforced.  But what has been applied and enforced is not God’s law – it is the 
state’s law.  Effectively, a religious state law is a contradiction in terms.78  
 
The actualization of Shari‘ah is simply not possible through the mechanism of state law.  
Thus, the obligation laid upon Muslims in regards to moral truth, is one of pursuit rather 
than attainment.  Shari‘ah takes on the form of a “discursive process that searches for 
Divine ideals,” and as such, “it is a work in progress that is never complete.”79  In this 
sense, the obligation to strive towards the Divine ideal remains constant throughout the 
Muslim’s entire lifetime.  
 
As I understand it, the most important point we should take from Abou El Fadl’s account of 
the epistemology of Shari‘ah, is a point about the fallibility of human interpretations of the 
Qur’an and Sunnah, and particularly the way those interpretations are implemented into 
political and legal arrangements.  This admission in no way challenges the idea of the 
perfection of God, nor the conception of God as the only sovereign being.  That our 
interpretations “can be re-thought, deconstructed, and re-developed if need be,”80 is 
crucially linked to the idea that Shari‘ah is more than just a set of positive rules.  In fact, the 
inability to formulate perfect legal injunctions ought to serve to focus Muslims’ attention 
on the objective moral values presented in the Qur’an.  Since the pursuit of Divinity is a 
                                                
78 Abou El Fadl (2003) pp. 325 
79 Abou El Fadl (2003) p. 325 
80 Abou El Fadl (2003) p. 327 
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never-ending affair, and is also obligatory, the primary guidance Muslims have been given 
come in the form of moral norms.  The normative values extracted from the Qur’an should 
inform one’s reading of it, and should concur with any specific codes of conduct 
formulated from it.  Insisting on a literalist approach to the Qur’an goes hand in hand with 
the assumption that humans can have perfect access to the Divine Will, and can lead to 
what Abou El Fadl cleverly characterizes as “the use of Shari‘ah to undermine Shari‘ah.”81  
With these points in mind I will turn now to Abou El Fadl’s investigation into the 
substantive norms prioritized by Shari‘ah. 
 
3.3    Core values of Shari‘ah 
In his appeal to the primacy of what he often refers to as “core values” of the Qur’an, Abou 
El Fadl speaks of three indispensable values: justice, pluralism, and mercy.  He outlines an 
intricate interplay between these norms in the Qur’anic discourse, which serves to orient 
the believer in her pursuit of the approximation of the Divine ideal.  This interplay, 
properly understood, can play a key role in the justification of modern-day human rights 
institutions and safeguards.  Before I come to the discussion of these core values, it will be 
important to spend a few words situating them amidst the relationship between God and 
man.  
 
3.3.1    The viceregency of man 
In the Qur’an, the relationship between God and man is characterized by a Divine trust 
(khilafah) that positions humans as the viceregents of God on earth.82  While it is certainly 
an honor to represent God on earth, this honor also entails a great deal of responsibility.  As 
God’s representatives, human beings take on the burden of realizing the path of God 
                                                
81 Abou El Fadl (2004) p. 15.  To illustrate his point here, Abou El Fadl mentions the enactment of overly-
restrictive laws (such as the ban on female drivers in Saudi Arabia), that result in oppresion, even though they 
are predicated on legitimate norms of Shari‘ah (in this case, modesty). 
82 Kamali (2008) p. 14.  Also see Qur’an 2:30, 33:72, 38:26 
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(Shari‘ah) on earth.83  As has already been discussed, the nature of this Divine path is such 
that it is unattainable, but nonetheless there exists a duty to pursue it.  What is important to 
understand about the notion of man as viceregent is that it is very much the foundation of 
Abou El Fadl’s political theory.  As human beings, the Divine trust we have contracted 
with God compels us to construct a political order that nurtures the values embodied in 
Shari‘ah.  Consequently for Abou El Fadl, any Islamic theory of human rights will 
necessarily proceed from this premise.  Fulfilling human rights becomes a Divine charge.  
 
3.3.2    Justice, pluralism and mercy 
Abou El Fadl visualizes justice at the center of the Qur’anic discourse regarding what kinds 
of duties have been laid upon humans through their appointment as God’s viceregents.  He 
posits the achievement of justice as a “unique human charge and necessity,” owed to God 
and also to fellow human beings.84  But justice is an inherently vague concept, and so 
saying that human beings have a duty to be just is useless, unless we have a sense of the 
distinctive characteristics of justice.  The project of defining justice forces us to confront 
the authority of Shari‘ah.  As God’s law, Shari‘ah is perfectly just, so if we are trying to 
define justice then how ought the authority of Shari‘ah bear on that task?  As Abou El Fadl 
puts it plainly, “does the Divine law define justice or does justice define the Divine law?”85  
His answer to this question is quite clear: justice shall define the Divine law.  He rejects the 
notion that an exploration of justice ought to simply defer to the authority of Divine law, 
because this perspective entails a largely positivist reading of the Qur’an.  In terms of 
establishing a foundation for human rights, it is necessary to explore the basic elements of 
justice and the means to attaining it, and then link these ideas to human rights claims.  The 
idea that specific codified rules give us all we need to know about the concept of justice 
explicitly rejects this analytical process.  This points to the heart of Abou El Fadl’s 
contention that humans should never expect to have perfect access to God’s Will.  When 
                                                
83 Abou El Fadl (2004-2005) p. 2 
84 Abou El Fadl (2004) pp. 18-19 
85 Abou El Fadl, Islam and Democratic Commitment (2003) p. 41  
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the relationship between Shari‘ah and justice is conceived of in this manner, we run the risk 
that “the subjectively determined Divine law becomes the embodiment of justice.”86  More 
to the point though, this approach fails because it posits law as prior to morality, and is thus 
at odds with the task of pursuing the path of God:   
Divinity is approached, in my view, through studying the divine moral 
imperatives, and not the rules of law because morality is prior to law, in the same 
way that God is prior to anything, including the text, law, or creation.  In my view, 
the primary commitment of a Muslim should be to God, and God’s moral essence, 
and not to the specific rules of law.  Therefore, if there is a conflict between the 
morality of a legal rule, and our moral conception of God, it is the latter that must 
take priority.87 
 
It is important to note however, that Abou El Fadl is not suggesting that we are free to 
simply construct any arbitrary notion of justice, and then ascribe to it the status of Divinity.  
He asserts that in fleshing out the demands of justice, Muslims ought pay heed to the way 
in which it is presented in the Qur’an, and specifically, the way in which it relates to two 
other Qur’anic values: pluralism and mercy. 
 
The fact of diversity and difference among people is repeatedly affirmed in the Qur’an.88  
Abou El Fadl contends that rather than being depicted as an unfortunate occurrence, this 
fact is described as part of the Divine plan.  Specifically, it is characterized as a gift from 
God that serves to illustrate that achieving justice requires human beings to cooperate with 
each other in a patient and tolerant way.89  This message is epitomized in the well-known 
Qur’anic statement that human beings were created in different “nations and tribes,” so that 
                                                
86 Abou El Fadl, Islam and Democratic Commitment (2003) p. 41.  There is actually a good deal of 
discussion over the authenticity of this hadith.  Since I am only recounting Abou El Fadl’s ideas here, I do not 
pass judgment on this question. 
87 Abou El Fadl (2003) p. 358  
88 Qur’an 5:48, 6:35, 6:108, 11:118, 10:99, 2:256 
89 Abou El Fadl (2004) p. 20 
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they would “come to know each other.”90  This pluralistic spirit can be better understood if 
we consider it in relation to the concept of mercy in the Qur’an.  
 
Abou El Fadl locates the centrality of mercy in the Qur’anic discourse in its being 
identified as a Divine attribute,91 and also its being used to describe the gift of the Qur’an 
to humankind.92  Importantly, the Prophet was to have linked the ideas of mercy and 
diversity when he said, “The disagreement of my companions is a mercy.”93  To fully 
appreciate the significance of the linking of these two concepts, Abou El Fadl stresses that 
we must have a proper understanding of the Qur’anic conception of mercy.  It is by no 
means simply analogous to some notion of forgiveness: 
Rather it is a state in which the individual is able to be just with him or herself and 
others by giving each individual person his or her due.  Fundamentally, mercy is 
tied to a state of genuine perception of others- which is why in the Qur’an mercy 
is coupled with the need for human beings to be patient with and tolerant of each 
other.94 
 
Mercy understood as “genuine perception of others” helps us to better understand the idea 
that diversity is a merciful Divine gift.  It compels us to examine our differences and come 
to appreciate and utilize them in a way that is virtuous and fruitful, in an effort towards 
genuine understanding of one another.  If we return to the connection between justice and 
diversity--that coming to “know one another” is a command for social cooperation in the 
pursuit of justice--and if we link this to the concept of mercy that Abou El Fadl presents, 
then we can begin to see the substance of his theory coalesce.  Combined with his assertion 
that God embodies objective moral values, which humans have a duty to strive towards, he 
concludes: 
On this view, then, the divine mandate for a Muslim polity is to pursue justice by 
adhering to the need for mercy.  Although coexistence is a basic necessity for 
                                                
90 Qur’an 49:13 
91 Qur’an 6:12, 6:54 
92 Abou El Fadl, Islam and Democratic Commitment (2003) p. 42.  Also see Qur’an 21:107, 16:89 
93 Abou El Fadl (2004-2005) p. 22.  Also see Qur’an 11:118-119 
94 Abou El Fadl (2004) pp. 21-22 
 44 
mercy, in order to pursue genuine knowledge of the other and aspire to a state of 
justice human beings need to cooperate in seeking the good and the beautiful, and 
do so by engaging in a purposeful moral discourse.  Implementing legalistic rules, 
even if such rules are the product of an interpretation of divine texts, is not 
sufficient for mercy-genuine perception of the other- or, ultimately, for justice 
(emphasis added).95 
 
So now the stage has been set, so to speak, as I have tried to highlight the major normative 
values that underlie Abou El Fadl’s justification of human rights.  But respect for (and even 
obligations towards) values such as justice and mercy does not necessitate political 
arrangements centered around human rights.  These kinds of ideals are simply too vague 
and imprecise.  Depending on how we conceive of the demands of justice, different people 
may arrive at varying conclusions about the value of rights.  Establishing broad principles 
like these is helpful no doubt; justice, pluralism and mercy are noteworthy ideals.  But the 
key in any theory of human rights is how the more fundamental principles are linked to 
specific rights-claims.  I will turn now to Abou El Fadl’s discussion of rights in Islam, in an 
attempt at fleshing out, or at least getting us a bit closer to, exactly how he links specific 
rights institutions to the more general normative values of Shari‘ah. 
 
3.4    Rights in Islam 
The notion of rights is not a foreign concept in the Islamic juristic discourse, and so in 
formulating the links between general norms and specific human rights claims, Abou El 
Fadl takes this discourse as a starting point.  It is important to note from the outset that the 
arabic term haqq (pl. huquq), which is translated as “right” in english, is often said to 
connote a variety of meanings including “justice, right as opposed to falsehood, a legal 
claim, an obligation, something that is proven, and an assigned portion.”96  A consequence 
of this ambiguity is that the notion of a right in the Qur’anic discourse takes on a different 
personality than the modern-day notion of right as individual entitlement.  But that the 
Qur’an and the traditional juristic discourses don’t articulate a conception of rights that is 
                                                
95 Abou El Fadl (2004) p. 22 
96 Kamali (2008) p. 201 
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instantaneously equivalent to the contemporary notion of rights, shouldn’t surprise us.  As I 
have already mentioned the contemporary construction of a right is certainly no more than 
400 years old, and in the context of this paper this history is more accurately placed at 
around 60 years (so as to coincide with the creation of the UDHR).  What we should take 
from the ambiguity of the term haqq, and in fact what Abou El Fadl does such a good job 
of demonstrating, is that it provides a fertile starting ground to explore the concept of 
human rights in Islam, and further serves to clarify what features of the discourse may need 
to be reconsidered and reconstructed. 
 
Abou El Fadl explains that rights have traditionally been thought of as belonging to either 
God or humans, or both.  Rights considered exclusive to God relate to matters that are 
thought to be exclusively commanded by God and for God.  Obvious examples of these 
sorts of matters include acts of ritual and worship.97  Here, we immediately notice the 
complex connotations of the term haqq, which describes the act of daily prayers as God’s 
right (rather than, say, human obligation).  Abou El Fadl fleshes out the concept nicely 
though, when he makes the point that a defining feature of God’s rights is that they fall 
exclusively into God’s jurisdiction.  Only God can confer punishment for the violation of 
these rights, and similarly, only God is capable of granting forgiveness of such violations.98   
 
Interestingly enough, in the juristic discourse all rights not explicitly claimed by God are 
said to accrue to human beings.  Just as violations of God’s rights can only be forgiven by 
God, violations of people’s rights can only be forgiven by people, and specifically only by 
the individual whose rights have been violated.99  Abou El Fadl explains that this idea of 
properly assigning the power to pardon is a defining characteristic of the Islamic rights 
discourse, and of the notion of haqq itself.  Muslim jurists have traditionally considered the 
rights of people “as arising from a legal cause brought about by the suffering of a legal 
                                                
97 Abou El Fadl (2004-2005) p. 16 
98 Abou El Fadl (2004) p. 25 
99 Abou El Fadl (2004) p. 25-26 
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wrong.” Thus, “a person does not possess a right until he or she has been wronged and, as a 
result, obtains a claim for retribution of compensation.”100  When we understand rights to 
be conceived of in this way, we can make better sense of the sort of open-ended idea that 
all matters not relating to God’s rights are necessarily thought to exist in the realm of 
people’s rights.   
 
Nonetheless, this idea of rights as claims for retribution has left a distinct mark upon the 
discussion of rights in Islam.  Abou El Fadl laments that despite the extremely broad 
conception of human rights as all rights not explicitly claimed by God, “the juristic practice 
has tended to focus on narrow legal claims that may be addressed through the processes of 
law rather than on broad theoretical categories that were perceived as non-justiciable before 
a court.”101  So, the juristic discussion of “human rights” in Islam has mainly focused on 
property rights and rights to monetary compensation- the type of rights that can be 
adjudicated easily.  It is important however, to note that this focus is not because of the 
theoretical impossibility of other rights accruing to humans, but instead due to perceptions 
about what kinds of rights are and aren’t justiciable.102  
 
In order to construct sufficient justifications for human rights, Abou El Fadl argues that the 
notion of rights in Islamic discourses will need to be transformed from one of retributive 
claims to one of inherent immunities and entitlements that precede any legal 
wrongdoing.103 Two questions arise then:  1) How can this be done?  and, 2) which specific 
rights can garner support from the Islamic tradition?  The answer to the first question has 
largely been laid out already, but it will be useful to recount and summarize how all that 
                                                
100 Abou El Fadl (2003) p. 336 
101 Abou El Fadl, Islam and Democratic Commitment (2003) p. 51.  Ironically, we see contemporary 
resistance to economic and social rights, on the grounds that these types of rights are not sufficiently 
justiciable. 
102 Abou El Fadl, Islam and Democratic Commitment (2003) p. 51 
103 Abou El Fadl (2003) p. 336 
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has been said up to this point specifically informs a notion of rights as individual 
immunities and entitlements. 
 
3.4.1    Linking Abou El Fadl’s ideas to specific rights claims  
Abou El Fadl starts from the ontological assumption that objective moral principles and 
values do indeed exist, and these moral principles are embodied by God. This state of 
embodiment means that if human beings are to attempt to understand the essence of God, 
then at least part of that understanding will necessarily develop via the study and 
understanding of objective moral virtues. This ontology of God’s essence has significance 
because of the special relationship between God and human beings. 
 
This relationship is characterized by a trust that was established between God and humans 
when humans were appointed the viceregents of God on earth.  As deputies of God, 
humans have accepted the special responsibility of realizing the righteousness of God on 
earth.  But the totality of this righteous path, Shari‘ah, is of course unattainable by human 
beings.  Nonetheless, there are a number of moral virtues that God has revealed as 
approximations of his essence.  In considering these various virtues, Abou El Fadl stresses 
the preeminence of justice and mercy, with an added emphasis on how the Qur’anic ethic 
of pluralism informs our understanding of these two primary values. 
 
Understood properly, these values emphasize the importance of each and every Muslim 
discharging his or her duties to God. The fulfillment of every individual’s rights is essential 
to the idea of a just and merciful society.  But the articulation of which rights might be 
necessary in a just and merciful society is very much directed by the fact that Shari‘ah is an 
unrealizable ideal, and that the best Muslims can do is take part in a process of never-
ending pursuit of that ideal.  This means that a resultant scheme of rights will need to 
afford protection to individuals’ abilities to discharge such an obligation; most notably 
human agency and autonomy require protection.   
 
 48 
The reason why protection is afforded to all individuals rather than some sub-group of 
individuals (such as representatives of the state or the clerical class) is because individuals 
will be judged by God in the hereafter.104  Forcing individuals to discharge their obligations 
towards God is futile as this compromises the integrity of the acts.105  The Qur’an is quite 
clear that justice will be meted out by God on an individual basis; no one person can bear 
responsibility for the acts of another.106  Furthermore, the divine sanctity of human beings 
as individuals is celebrated in various Qur’anic verses,107 and of course, the ideal of mercy 
as “genuine perception of others,” requires that each and every individual possesses their 
respective rights.  Indeed, all of this leads Abou El Fadl to assert that “the notion of 
individual rights is actually easier to justify in Islam than a collectivist orientation.”108 
 
Under this line of thinking, the idea of rights in Islam becomes much more connected to an 
individual’s ability to discharge his or her duties to God.  Because these are constant and 
perpetual duties to strive towards the Divine ideal (which itself requires autonomy and 
agency), the necessary rights needed to protect them must be conceptualized as immunities 
and entitlements, rather than as retributive or compensatory claims.  Hopefully at this point, 
I have done justice to Abou El Fadl’s work, at least in terms of answering the first of the 
two questions posed above.109   
 
We’ve come now to an interesting point in the paper as I will try (or at least I have implied 
that I will try) to answer the second question, which is concerned with identifying a 
specific list of rights supported by Abou El Fadl’s methodology.  I say this is interesting 
because in fact, as far as I can tell, we won’t find a detailed and comprehensive list of 
rights in Abou El Fadl’s writing!  This however, does not mean that we have come all this 
                                                
104 Abou El Fadl, Islam and Democratic Commitment (2003) p. 57 
105 Abou El Fadl, Islam and Democratic Commitment (2003) p. 57  See also Qur’an 2:256, 10:99-100 
106 See Qur’an 6:164, 17:15, 35:18, 39:7, 53:38 
107 For instance, Qur’an 5:32, 17:70 
108 Abou El Fadl (2004) p. 29 
109 See section 3.4 above 
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way for naught.  Abou El Fadl may not give us a totally complete theory of human rights, 
but I do believe that he gets us close enough, so that most of the dirty work is already done, 
so to speak.  Importantly, he formulates a political theory that honors human autonomy and 
agency, and which emphasizes the individual accountability of humans before God.  By 
underlining the fundamentally unrealizable nature of the Divine ideal, he clarifies the 
proper role of the state vis-à-vis the promotion of that ideal.  The goal of an Islamic 
government should be to nurture the potentialities of its citizens; to offer them optimal 
conditions under which individuals can approximate the Divine ideal to the best of their 
abilities.  From this perspective, an Islamic government fails: 
unless people are guaranteed the right to rational development.  Furthermore, the 
right to rational development means that people ought to be entitled to minimum 
standards of well-being, in both the physical and intellectual senses.  It is 
impossible to pursue rational development if one is not fed, housed, educated, and, 
above all, safe from physical harm or persecution.  In addition, people cannot 
pursue a reflective life unless they are guaranteed freedom of conscience, 
expression, and assembly with like-minded people.110 
 
So there it is.  It’s not an explicit call for support of the UDHR, but it certainly gets us in 
the vicinity.  Should we however, be disappointed with anything less than outright 
endorsement of the Declaration?  It’s a tricky question.  Of course, in some sense we are 
left wanting more; the critics will perhaps claim that there is vagueness to Abou El Fadl’s 
words that indicate his real intentions of simply paying lip-service to human rights 
norms.111  In my view such a charge bears no merit, however it does help to clarify the 
point that the idea of plural justification is not simply equivalent to a modus vivendi.112  The 
goal is that all groups express genuine and sincere support of human rights.  Measuring 
sincerity is of course not a theoretical matter, but an empirical one; we can best judge the 
                                                
110 Abou El Fadl (2003) p. 326 
111 See Pipes (2004) 
112 Rawls is adamant about this point.  See Rawls (2005) pp. 145-149.  A modus vivendi respresents a 
situation in which all or some of the parties to an agreement come to that agreement through a state of self-
interest.  Perhaps the conditions of the agreement are temporarily useful, but when the circumstances change 
and the self-interested parties can pursue their interests better by breaking the agreement, they will do so. 
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intentions of others by observing their public behavior and pronouncements on human 
rights.  It would of course make things easier if groups would explicitly endorse the 
UDHR, but it seems possible that a sense of trust could develop between citizens simply in 
virtue of some shared public behavior that demonstrates support for human rights.  This 
point about public behavior raises an interesting question regarding the results of 
competing accounts of human rights.  Does plural justification of human rights mandate 
some shared universal behavior, particularly in the sense of state policies and laws? 
 
3.5    Does plural justification of human rights mandate universal practice? 
This is a question about exactly how thorough our consensus need be.  The identification of 
norms at a general level is a much different animal than the identification of the specific 
scope, weight, and practical implications of each particular norm.  A rights-based political 
order will inevitably, and in fact constantly, be forced to balance specific rights against 
each other.  Does the idea of plural justification intimate that we must arrive at consensus 
on specific judgments in regards to balancing rights?  It seems doubtful, although I haven’t 
given this question enough thought to say for sure.  Jack Donnelly’s ideas on the matter 
seem intuitive.  He classifies human rights norms as existing on three levels: the concept of 
the right, the interpretation of that concept, and the implementation of a specific 
interpretation.  He claims that consensus is necessary at the general level of concept, 
permitting rare deviations in our interpretations of the meaning of certain rights, and 
allowing for a fair amount of variance in our implementation of specific rights in everyday 
policy.113  Simply put, he argues that we should be collectively committed to some specific 
universal set of rights, but this commitment does not bind us all to some universal set of 
policies and practices.  There are different ways to realize the same rights.  How sound 
Donnelly’s ideas are, is of course a topic for another day, but nonetheless a matter that 
must be taken up.  In some sense, these questions may be more important than the ones I 
have addressed in this paper, as these seem to be more closely related to matters of 
                                                
113 See Donnelly (2003) pp. 94-98 & Donnelly (2007) pp. 298-306 
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everyday policy, which certainly bears an immediate impact on the realization or 
obstruction of human rights around the world. 
 
Before I conclude, I would like to quickly return to Abou El Fadl, and make two comments 
about the project of Islamic justification of human rights.  Unfortunately, because of space 
constraints, I can only treat these points in a cursory manner. 
 
3.6    Dignity and justifying human rights 
It is important to recall the idea that the UDHR contains the elementary premise of the 
inherent and equal dignity of human beings.  It was said that while various normative 
traditions are free to articulate their own “homegrown” justifications for human rights, it 
seems necessary that each tradition will need to engage the dignity doctrine in some way or 
another.   
 
Interestingly enough, in recounting Abou El Fadl’s justifications for human rights, I have 
not mentioned the word dignity even once.  I think, or I suppose I hope, that my avoidance 
of the notion of dignity has been a fair move, in terms of depicting Abou El Fadl’s ideas.  I 
certainly don’t think that he has no interest in the idea of dignity and how it relates to 
human rights.  But it’s clear that there are other concepts and ideas that he views to be more 
urgent to the project of justifying human rights within an Islamic framework.  Abou El 
Fadl’s theory is very much centered around the idea that human beings hold certain duties 
towards God.114  Rights are necessary to help facilitate and ensure that humans are able to 
discharge these duties.  There are of course other key concepts involved--justice, mercy, 
and pluralism, to name a few--but the interesting point is that the idea of dignity does not 
seem to play a primary role.  The Qur’anic verse that explicitly announces the dignity of all 
                                                
114 Interestingly, John Locke, oftern considered as a sort of “founding-father” of modern rights, also used 
human obligations to God as grounds for rights. 
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human beings is only mentioned by Abou El Fadl once in the writings I reviewed, and it is 
in somewhat of a passing fashion.115   
 
I must repeat, I do not claim that Abou El Fadl neglects or fails to value the notion of 
dignity; I am inclined to say he does the opposite.  Rather, I simply point out that his 
writings seem to focus on a number of other ideas, suggesting that these other ideas hold a 
certain priority.  Is this a possible weakness?  It’s hard to say.  In order to ascertain whether 
or not some specific theory of human rights addresses the notion of dignity adequately, we 
need to first hold a fairly well thought-out conception of dignity itself.  What exactly does 
dignity mean in the first place?  What does it entail?  How much consensus must there be 
on this meaning?  Perhaps Abou El Fadl has addressed the idea of dignity implicitly in his 
writing, in some way addressing certain constitutive elements of dignity.  I haven’t thought 
about this enough to offer any ideas.  But I think it raises an important question on a 
general level:  How much of a role must the idea of dignity play in a justification of human 
rights?   
 
3.7    Plural justification and cultural essentialization 
Plural justification of human rights does not require us to essentialize or over-simplify our 
understanding of particular religions and traditions, nor the people belonging to them.  I 
think Abou El Fadl presents a good theory of human rights.  But I don’t claim that if a 
Muslim wants to support human rights, then she must adhere to Abou El Fadl’s ideas.  
Perhaps there are better Islamic grounds for human rights that piece together a different 
understanding of the relationship between Shari‘ah, theology, and rights.  This of course, is 
a matter for Muslims to work out.   
 
Furthermore, Muslims are free to support human rights from “secular” grounds if they 
want, perhaps for example, some type of Kantian or utilitarian grounds.  By supporting an 
                                                
115 The Qur’anic verse I refer to is sura 17 verse 70.  For the reference I refer to in Abou El Fadl’s work see: 
Abou El Fadl (2007) p. 183. 
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account of human rights that emphasizes the priority of Shari‘ah in Muslim life, I don’t 
pass any judgment on whether or not this prioritization is necessary for all Muslims.  There 
exists strong opposition to the idea that Muslim support for human rights need be grounded 
in Shari‘ah.116  Proponents of this position view the West’s adoption of human rights, 
specifically Protestantism, as a model that should be emulated by the Islamic tradition.  
This model requires the secularization of the public sphere in a way that reformulates 
religion as a strictly private matter.  Thus, Shari‘ah has no place in public life, and is 
unnecessary towards the project of justifying human rights.   
 
This depiction of the secular Muslim position is crude and incomplete, but I will just say 
this: Whether or not a process of secularization (whatever that means) is important to 
building support for human rights in Muslim countries is beside the point.  Work by 
scholars such as Abou El Fadl who try to locate religious grounds for human rights is both 
important and necessary to the adequate justification of human rights.  This is because of 
the general commitment of human rights to the inherent and equal dignity of all human 
beings, and the specific human rights commitment to freedom of religion and belief.  
Perhaps some Muslims are comfortable supporting human rights on secular grounds, but 
the question is, are all?  As long as there remain Muslims who choose not to overlook the 
priority of Shari‘ah, then our respect for their dignity and freedom of belief mandates that 
we embrace Shari‘ah-oriented justifications for human rights.  Theories of human rights 
should be judged according to how well they justify rights, not how they justify rights. 
 
                                                
116 See for example: Chase (2006) & Afshari (1994) 
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4    Final Remarks 
In this thesis I have tried to confront some of the questions that arise when we consider the 
possibility of justifying universal moral and political norms, such as human rights, in a 
permanently plural world.  I have not tried to spell out some specific substantive grounds of 
human rights that I find to be “true.”  Instead, I have tried to partly describe the conditions 
under which our justifications of human rights will be most adequate.  I have endorsed the 
idea that these conditions require a plurality of competing, and perhaps even mutually 
exclusive justificatory schemes.  
 
The moral force of this claim has been located in the ethos of human rights, particularly the 
general commitment to the equal and inherent dignity of all human beings, and the more 
specific commitment to freedom of religion or belief.  The reader has also been reminded 
of the inherent receptiveness of the UDHR to the idea of plural justification of human 
rights. 
 
The two major theoretical tools I have tried to employ in explaining why plural justification 
of human rights is necessary, are Jeffrey Stout’s “contextual account of justification,” and 
John Rawls’ explanation of reasonable disagreement via the “burdens of judgment.”   
Stout’s ideas help to clarify the process of justification, in particular, what we aim to do 
when we justify something, and how those aims can be achieved in a way that is considered 
to be successful.  His idea that particular justifications are aimed towards specific 
audiences is of key importance.  That we disagree on the answers to any number of 
fundamental metaphysical questions demonstrates the fact that in many cases, all human 
beings cannot be considered to be part of the same “audience,” in Stout’s use of the term.   
 
The idea of reasonable disagreement lends moral legitimacy to the existence of multiple 
audiences in relation to the justification of human rights.  Further, Rawls’ articulation of 
the burdens of judgment (or something like it) offers the best way to understand our 
systemic disagreement, as it explains this disagreement in a way that is conducive to 
fostering mutual respect of disagreement among citizens.  Mutual respect of disagreement 
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is crucially important to the idea of plural justification of human rights.  This is because, 
once we recognize the reasonableness of certain competing justifications of human rights, 
we cannot insist on the exclusion of one or more of these justifications from the public 
sphere.  To insist on such exclusion would be arbitrary and unjust. 
 
After establishing this core argument, I tried to clear up some misgivings the reader may 
have felt towards the idea of plural justification.  It was pointed out that the popular 
conception of tolerance was not suitable as a substitute for plural justification.  As opposed 
to the apathy of tolerance, the thesis claims that our justification of human rights is not 
fully adequate without the acceptance and promotion of a plurality of foundational 
schemes.  Recognizing the inherent and equal dignity of each other and the reasonableness 
of our reasons for asserting that dignity, does not entail simply “putting up” with one 
another’s ideas.  It is not simply about tolerating other people’s “mistaken” accounts of 
human rights, but instead, promoting principled support for human rights across our 
normative divides. 
 
Of course, recognizing that others hold good reasons for supporting human rights—good 
reasons that we coincidentally, might reject as false—does not propel us towards some 
distorted conception of truth.  We need not hold all competing accounts to be 
simultaneously true, nor must we accept that none of them are true.  We may not however, 
insist that we alone hold good reasons for supporting human rights. 
 
After describing and arguing for the idea of plural justification of human rights in the first 
half of the paper, I then turned to the work of Khaled Abou El Fadl in the second half.  I 
won’t recount his ideas here, but rather just offer some concluding remarks on the value of 
his work.   
 
What Abou El Fadl’s work demonstrates first and foremost, I think, is that there exist 
fertile grounds within the Islamic tradition for developing principled support for human 
rights.  Although I haven’t looked into the matter yet in an adequate way, I suspect that all 
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of the major world religions possess similar receptibility to the idea of human rights.  
Crucial to my optimism is the fact that human rights is surely not in Rawlsian terms, an 
example of a comprehensive doctrine.  There are many important moral and political 
questions, perhaps even the most important questions, that are left untreated by the idea of 
human rights.  Perhaps building a philosophy of human rights will require a bit more work 
in some traditions than in others, but it seems likely that in only rare instances will it 
require the wholesale expungement of prior beliefs.  I think this is an important point. 
 
It is easy for proponents and theorists of human rights and perhaps even more so everyday 
people in the West, to view the emergence of human rights as a collective act of casting 
away primitive and antiquated beliefs, in favor of the more evolved doctrine of human 
rights.  But I think this is an inadequate understanding of the history of human rights.  
Locke’s motivation for endorsing rights was similar to Abou El Fadl’s; rights are necessary 
in order to carry out our obligations to God.  In time, the mainstream conception of rights 
in the West certainly became secularized, but it is interesting to ask the question, “How 
much secularization is needed for the realization of human rights?”117  Answering such a 
question could be, and I am sure has been, the topic of another paper.  I do not have such 
space here so I will just say this: In the face of authentic and reasonable religious grounds 
for human rights, theorists may need to rethink the extent of secularization that is required 
for human rights to be upheld in some modern-day society.  Calls for the public filtering or 
translation of religious motivations into some “neutral” moral language seem unnecessary 
and in fact, unjust.118  Religious people shouldn’t have to bisect their lives according to 
some imaginary public/private divide.  Simply put, I don’t think that endorsing human 
rights is simply a matter of shedding an old, worn tradition in favor of some newer, more 
appropriate worldview.  Recognizing that the West’s history of coming to terms with 
human rights was as much a process of reinterpretation and revision as Abou El Fadl’s 
                                                
117 See Freeman (2004) pp. 389-391 on the secularization of rights theory.   
118 For example see Habermas (2005), or Rawls (2005) pp. 440-490 
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ideas represent to the Islamic tradition, could go a long way in making the idea of plural 
justification appear much more common-sensical. 
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